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Abstract:
This paper examines the popular philosophical theory of moral relativism. Traditionally,
the theory argues that communities have their own conceptual frameworks of morality
that are inaccessible to those outside of the community. Thus, one community cannot
give another community a moral reason to change a practice. In this paper, I will
examine David Velleman’s version of the theory presented in his book Foundations for
Moral Relativism. This version posits that the drive towards mutual interpretability is a
universal drive among human communities. From this drive stem all the practices and
moral values of communities. However, Velleman does not believe that this implies that
communities can understand each others’ conceptual frameworks. In this way, his
account remains a normal version of moral relativism. I will argue that there are some
cases in which a person can understand a different community’s conceptual framework
enough to provide a reason for that community to change a practice. Importantly, my
argument will not say that the reasons for change are moral reasons. They will be
practical reasons based on the normative fact that human communities should strive
towards mutual interpretability. Thus, my account will also maintain the crucial tenets of
moral relativism. If accomplished, this argument will add a great power to the theory.
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I.

Introduction
The term moral relativism is usually met with confusion or disgust. It is asked,

“Does moral relativism mean that there is no right or wrong morality?” Yes and no. It
states that within our own communities, the morals that we have are true for us. We can
determine that, for example, murder is worse than stealing, and this will be a true
judgment in our community. However, moral relativism argues that we cannot accurately
understand or make judgments of another community’s morality. We cannot determine
with any validity that murder is worse than stealing in any community besides our own.
This community has a different conceptual framework that makes certain practices right
for that community. How could someone believe a theory like this? It seems so
obviously wrong. There are certain actions or practices that we tend to believe (or maybe
even need to believe) cannot be morally acceptable no matter what community they are
in. In general, the appeal of moral relativism is that it explains the large, sometimes
enormous, gaps in moral values from community to community. Yet it fails to account
for the things that still seem obviously wrong even after the relativity of morality is
acknowledged.
In this paper, I will examine a defense of moral relativism entitled Foundations
for Moral Relativism. This book, written by David Velleman, is consistent with many
versions of moral relativism in in stating that no community can understand the morality
of any other community. It differs from most accounts of moral relativism, though, in
that it posits a universal condition of human communities: the drive towards mutual
interpretability. This drive, which I will explain in detail, leads Velleman to argue that
some communities can be more advanced than others. They can be more advanced in
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their facilitation of mutual interpretability, but, importantly, they cannot be more
advanced in any moral sense (a claim that I will focus on in this paper). He still does not
allow an understanding of any other community’s morality, nor does he allow one
community to give another community a reason to change a practice. I differ from David
Velleman in that I believe the notion of mutual interpretability can allow one community
to give another community a reason to change a practice. My account remains morally
relative because I argue for this ability to give reasons on practical grounds, not moral
grounds. This maintains the legitimacy of moral relativism while still accounting for the
feeling that there are certain practices that as outsiders we can provide reason to change.
In the first section of my paper, I will explain and defend David Velleman’s
particular version of moral relativism. In the second section of my paper, I will explain
the crucial differences between our two versions of moral relativism. Lastly, I will
explain and defend why these differences allow one community to give another
community a reason to change in certain cases.
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II.

Doables and Mores
To understand the concept of mutual interpretability, we must begin with chapter

three of Foundations for Moral Relativism, entitled “Doables.” In any given community,
there is a domain of “doable” actions, actions that are normal and acceptable. What is
doable in one community may be totally foreign and unnatural in another. The way in
which people greet each other is a doable, and it varies greatly from one society to the
next. In Ibo society (south-eastern Nigeria), a normal handshake involves a grip of the
forearm. In England, a normal handshake involves simply grasping hands. If an
Englishman and an Ibo man were to meet, both would be perplexed as to what the other
person was doing (29). The function of doables is to create a sense of ordinariness. With
a set of normal and acceptable actions, people know how to act in a way that will allow
them to be interpreted. In order to function in a society, one must be able to interpret
others, and must be themselves interpretable to others. A society without any sort of
widely accepted set of doables is unfathomable. It would be chaos. People would not be
able to interact with one another. That doables play a governing role in society and allow
people to be interpreted is obvious. However, “doables” is a limited term. Velleman has
another term, “mores,” (pronounced more-ase) which includes not just actions, but also
attitudes. This term is more all-encompassing than doables, as it includes the “ways of
thinking, feeling, and acting” on which a community converges.
Moral actions can be considered mores in the same way that non-moral actions
can. Therefore, because any society or community has its own conceptual framework of
mores, it also has its own conceptual framework of morality. Velleman’s example of
lying illustrates this point nicely. Different communities have different ideas and
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conceptual frameworks of what lying is, which fundamentally change how the practice is
understood. The Javanese have a practice called étok-étok, in which it is customary to
withhold certain information from strangers, even if that information would cause the
person no harm and might help the stranger (35). In our western conceptual framework,
it is tempting to ask the Javanese, “Why don’t you tell the truth?” But this would be to
get things wrong, Velleman says. To tell a Javanese person to tell the truth would not
make any coherent sense to that person, because we would be using “a concept of truthtelling that may not be rationally salient, or even available, in a community where étokétok is a common form of indicative utterance” (44). Our western conception of truth
might be totally foreign in many communities where truth functions on more of a sliding
scale, or is not given as much importance socially. That is why we cannot simply say
that lying is wrong. When we say the word lying, we are already using our own
conception of truth- and also turning it into a moral issue, because we view it as a moral
issue in our community. Rather, we must say “lying is wrong for members of our
community” (45).
Not only do conceptual frameworks vary in different communities, he argues,
they also provide motivating reasons for action in that community. The practice of étokétok is an anthropological fact about Javanese society, but it is also an action-guiding
principle. One utilizes étok-étok because it is an ordinary action for a Javanese person to
perform, and people perform ordinary actions because they want to be understood in their
community. Their reasons for acting are based on their community’s ways of acting, and
their situation in the community. Reasons for acting are then perspective-dependent, in
Velleman’s words.
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Velleman uses the example of receiving directions to show that something is only
action-guiding by virtue of what “position” a person is in. If David Velleman himself
asks someone on Fifth Avenue for directions to Washington Square, the answer he will
receive is “It’s straight ahead” (48). This is a valid, action-guiding statement only
because of David Velleman’s position. If he were on Sixth Avenue, the direction “It’s
straight ahead,” would not be a valid, action-guiding direction. Velleman uses this as an
analogy to explain the relativity of morals. A member of the Mbuti tribe might say,
“Female circumcision is wrong.” For those in the Mbuti tribe, this has an action-guiding
ring to it. The Mbuti are, metaphorically, in the right “position” for this proposition to be
action-guiding, because it is a practice that is not acceptable in their community. But
jump to another community, and the case may be totally different. To tell a member of
the Kikuyu tribe that female circumcision is wrong (the Kikuyu practice female
circumcision) would be false. That would be like telling a David Velleman who is on
Sixth Avenue, not Fifth Avenue that Washington Square is straight ahead. Additionally,
his use of the words true and false is not an elastic use. He believes it is completely true
for the Mbuti that female circumcision is wrong, and also completely true for the Kikuyu
that female circumcision is right. The difference is in their “positions”- meaning their
community’s ways of thinking, feeling and acting.
Velleman uses a different analogy to explain why specific moralities are binding
on certain groups. If someone on earth says, “Rocks tend to fall downwards,” this is a
true statement, because they are on earth. This would also carry practical guidance with
it. One could learn that if they pick up a rock, it is going to feel heavy. (Obviously, this
is not advice that we need, because we already know it, but pretend that we did not). An
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astronaut in outer space saying the same thing would be lying. It would not carry
practical guidance with it, because in outer space, rocks do not tend to fall downwards.
Velleman believes the same mechanism follows with morality. If you say to someone
who occupies position P (someone in the Kikuyu community) that female circumcision is
right, this provides practical guidance by virtue of the person’s position P (52). To be in
position P is to be in a community where female circumcision is acceptable. One has to
occupy position P to feel the weight of the reason (why to act a certain way), just like
someone has to be on Earth to understand that a rock will fall when dropped. In morality,
normativity guides by virtue of position. However, this analogy faces a problem.
Gravity has an explanation. It exists wherever two things have physical weight.
Velleman claims that normativity exists “wherever considerations have the weight of
reason.” But what gives these considerations so much weight? What is it about being in
a particular community that influences one so strongly to follow that community’s way of
life?
Velleman’s answer to this question is essentially a psychological claim. This
claim is that people have a strong, inherent drive towards sociality. This drive facilitates
the convergence on ways of life, i.e. the convergence on mores and therefore morality.
And once these ways of life are developed, they become binding on the members of the
community.
In general, people tend to hold values that are similar to the values of other people
around them. That is, communities tend to converge on certain beliefs and valuations.
One community can value a type of person that is completely devalued in another
community. Wealthy people are admired in the United States, while poor people are
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admired in communities of ascetic monks. This phenomenon, Velleman argues, is a
result of his gravity principle. He uses himself as an example of how being part of a
community determines ones values. Velleman is a member of the community of
Greenwich Village in New York City. Residents of Greenwich Village assert that widely
cited scholars are admirable (58). For these residents, this is true. It is true by virtue of
the fact that someone’s being a widely cited scholar is a reason to admire them, because
as Velleman says, “that’s the sort of people we admire” (58). Yet no one could assert
that widely cited scholars are admirable to everyone. A 7 year-old would not admire a
scholar. He would admire a funny cartoon character. One must remember, though, that
the fact that 7 year-olds admire cartoon characters is not in itself the reason for a 7 yearold to admire a cartoon character. It is simply the frame of reference from which we can
see that 7 year-olds are likely to admire funny cartoon characters. If you tell a 7 year-old
that there is a funny cartoon character named Eeyore, this will give the child a “complete
reason” for admiration (58).
Obviously, this is a simplification of the issue. Not everyone in a community
admires the same type of person. And not everyone in a community holds the same
moral values. However, the strong convergence on values inside any given community
provides strong evidence for this phenomenon in general.
Just like the gravity example, someone being admired in another community with
which we share no reasons gives us no reason to admire them. However, the fact that
someone is admired in our community does give us a reason to admire them. We are
pulled towards the similar ways of thinking, feeling, and acting (mores) which others in
our community share. These mores largely determine who we admire and what we value,
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including our moral beliefs. Velleman’s hypothesis is that the drive to converge on these
things is predicated on a desire for mutual interpretability. This concept will be the focus
of my next section, but it must wait a little longer. First, there are some criticisms
concerning what I have written so far. Velleman’s examples of Greenwich Village and a
Kikuyu tribe have important differences. Residents of Greenwich Village likely decided
to live there because the community’s values aligned with their own. Thus, they
converged on shared ways of thinking, feeling, and acting before becoming a part of the
community. A Kikuyu tribesman, in comparison, has no choice whether he is a part of
the community. He is born into the tribe, grows up there, and has no choice to join
another community. There are other worries about the definition of community. Can one
be a part of multiple communities? Are people really powerless against the drive to
converge with others, even if the ways of the community seem wrong? These are higherlevel concerns with Velleman’s argument that I will have important implications in my
paper.
There is also a question at this point about evaluating mores. Mores vary greatly
from community to community. How do we evaluate which community’s mores are
better? Velleman deems this a “nonsensical question” because it asks one to ignore the
fact that all reasons for acting are based on perspectives (62). Does the fact that all
reasons are based on perspectives mean that there are no real reasons? Also no,
Velleman replies. Reasons are real when they are normative and action-guiding. The
Kikuyu have real reasons to practice female circumcision, and the Mbuti have real
reasons not to. A “true” reason above and beyond the community is essentially a
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perspective-independent reason, which is not possible, says Velleman. If there is no
perspective then there can be no normativity!
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III.

Mutual Interpretability
One can see by now that the concepts of doables, mores, and mutual

interpretability are quite intertwined. The desire for mutual interpretability, which for
Velleman is the key in explaining relativism, requires converging on certain mores,
which are made up in part by doables. Mutual interpretability allows human beings to
have societies in which people can understand each other. The desire for mutual
interpretability led both the British and Nigerians to develop normal ways of greeting
with a handshake. However, these handshakes turned out very different, and as a result,
the two cultures have different mores of greeting, each uninterpretable to the other
culture.
This mutual interpretability allows us to successfully greet people, to order food
at a restaurant, and to understand a shared language. Our level of mutual interpretability
runs even deeper than those instances, though. We can instantly read complex emotions
and body language and understand the social forces shaping them. We can know if
someone will be upset if you lie to them, or more importantly, if they should be upset.
These complexities are different within every community. A smile on the street in Italy
does not mean the same thing as a smile on the street in San Francisco. Yet, whether a
smile is perceived as friendly or as sensual is predicated on the same thing- a desire to
make attitudes or actions consistently interpretable. The reason that David Velleman
posits this as his main evidence or his theory of moral relativism is simple. It is that
people want to be understood. They don’t want to live in a state of perpetual confusion
and meaninglessness.
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He also argues that there are communities that do a better job of ensuring mutual
interpretability than others. He writes the following about how we should evaluate a
society’s level of mutual interpretability: “How well do those reasons (for acting and
reacting) help [people] to understand themselves as the kind of creatures they are,
endowed with a somewhat fixed nature as human beings?” (67). He is not simply asking
how well a group’s reasons help them to understand what someone may want for lunch.
The criterion is how well a group’s reasons for action help them to understand each other
and themselves as human beings.
An example from a lecture by David Velleman at Claremont McKenna College in
November 2014 helped clarify this definition. Nazi soldiers in World War II, he said,
were terribly confused on an existential level. They may have all acted the same, but that
did not mean they had a high level of mutual interpretability. In fact, acting the same
probably lowered their level of mutual interpretability. They were absolutely unsure of
why they were acting the way that they were, and even more unsure of why everyone else
was acting the same way. Sadly, they could not see that they themselves were furthering
this confusion by appearing unfazed to their fellow soldiers. This example shows that
Velleman believes mutual interpretability to be more than just knowing how to act in a
community. More importantly, mutual interpretability is about knowing why oneself and
the community act the way they do. Some groups do not achieve this deeper level of
mutual interpretability very well. Other groups do a much better job.
At this point, we should examine whether David Velleman’s account is really
moral relativism at all. There are two major concerns. The first concern is that he seems
to be asserting some universal truth of what it is to be a human being. He argues that our
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“somewhat fixed nature” as human beings includes a drive towards mutual
interpretability, making it a universal matter. This does not seem very much like
relativism. The second concern is that one community can be more advanced than
another community in terms of mutual interpretability. If morality is relative, how can
one community do a better job than another? Velleman’s response to both of these
questions is dependent on the same point: that the drive towards mutual interpretability is
not a moral issue. The drive towards mutual interpretability is the determinant from
which all mores grow and develop (including morals). However, the moral values that
are set up in each community can differ greatly. One community can converge on
monogamous relationships as the best way to facilitate mutual interpretability in that
community. Another community may converge on polygamous relationships. Although
the drive towards mutual interpretability is universal, the morals that descend from it are
not. They can be drastically different. Thus, there is nothing universal about morals, or
any kind of mores. However, the drive towards mutual interpretability is universal.
Our second concern must now be addressed. How can one community be deemed
better than another community at facilitating mutual interpretability in a relativist
framework? Doesn’t relativism imply that no one community can be better than another?
Velleman would respond in like fashion to the last criticism by saying that a claim about
one community being more advanced than another does not mean that any one society’s
morality is more advanced. It simply means that one society does a better job of
facilitating mutual interpretability, a non-moral issue. Clearly one community can have
mores that better help people understand themselves and each other. This might seem
like a victory for the moral objectivists. Can’t one just say that the communities with
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superior mutual interpretability have superior morality? After all, they have the highest
mutual interpretability, the thing we should strive for! Yet it does not work that way.
This is because even the brute distinction of what qualifies as a moral issue can vary from
community to community. What is considered a moral issue in one community might not
count as a moral issue in another community. Remember the example of étok-étok. We
outsiders might look in and deem that lying. Our word “lying” carries with it a moral
connotation, turning it into a moral issue. However, to the Javanese, étok-étok is no more
a moral issue than is blowing one’s nose in our community. The evaluation of how well
a community’s mores (including morals) produce mutual interpretability is
understandable only to those inside the community. Thus, although we can say
conceptually that one community can do a better job than another at producing mutual
interpretability, we cannot make that judgment ourselves.
Yet we still might remain skeptical of Velleman’s claim that we cannot truly
understand another community’s mores. Once we learn how to give a proper handshake,
or what a smile on the street means in another community, it seems like we have the
requisite knowledge to assess mutual interpretability in that community. Velleman
argues that it is not quite that simple. A more complex example illustrates the sometimes
much larger gaps in understanding. In some communities, self-sacrifice is viewed as a
tremendously honorable thing. Communities such as the Japanese samurai warriors
practiced such self-sacrifice. In the United States today, no such thing is viewed as
honorable. As an outsider, I could not comment with any reason on whether samurai
self-sacrifice is a good or bad thing, because I don’t understand the complex and
culturally-specific concepts behind it. I may study the practice, but without inhabiting
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the perspective of someone living in the community, I have no true knowledge of how it
makes one feel. I can speculate, but I won’t know whether this practice allows people to
understand themselves and others as human beings, thus increasing mutual
interpretability.
If Velleman is right that one cannot gain true knowledge about another
community, then he is correct in saying that one cannot give another community a reason
to change. I may think that I can present the Kikuyu community a reason to eliminate
female circumcision: that it causes women shame and pain. Velleman would say that my
claim is an over-extension of knowledge that I do not really possess. As an outsider, I do
not have the right conceptual framework. The concept of shame that I employ in my
attempt to give reason for change is specific to my own community. I do not have access
to the concept of shame unique to the Kikuyu community. It is accessible only to those
inhabiting perspective P, to return to the gravity metaphor. Therefore, if I were to make
my criticism from within the community (say I were a member of the Kikuyu tribe), I
would understand how it affects mutual interpretability. In that case, my criticism would
carry reason with it. Velleman is quick to point out that criticism from the outside is
perfectly acceptable. Part of human nature is to criticize other communities where
morality is very different. The important thing, he says, is that people realize that their
criticism does not give reason to the community in question to change their practices.
This leaves Velleman in an interesting place with regard to his theory of progress.
Progress cannot be judged from outside of the community in question. It can only be
assessed from the inside. As a result, we have no way to compare different communities
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in any meaningful way. This theory is useful only for assessing progress within our own
community.
One worry about Velleman’s definition of progress and his argument in general
are his stipulations for what exactly decide community membership. Anyone can agree
that distinct communities exist in some form. My community at the Claremont Colleges
has drastic differences in terms of mores when compared with the Kikuyu community.
What happens when communities are similar, but still have slight distinctions? Does it
have any implications for Velleman’s argument that I could travel across the world to
England and still end up in a community with mores very similar to my own? What
about immigrants who are a part of two very different communities with opposing
mores? Velleman argued that reasons are perspective-dependent. If someone is able to
inhabit opposite perspectives at different times in their life, doesn’t that mean that they
will feel the weight of opposing reasons? If so, the person should be able to legitimately
comment on which mores better produce mutual interpretability- thus making the matter
objective and not relative. These are some issues that should be very concerning for
Velleman.
These questions have been answered at least partly. A community, for
Velleman’s purposes, is defined by frequent interaction of people in the community,
whether this interaction is voluntary or forced. Implied in this definition is that the
interaction is face-to-face (although this may certainly be changing in the digital age).
The boundaries of a community are purposefully unclear, as people interact with all sorts
of communities on any given day. A person may in a single day be a part of a school
community, a church community, a city community, and the community of their country
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as a whole. That one can belong to many different communities is obvious, and it does
not hurt Velleman’s argument. On the second question, whether someone who is a part
of two distinct communities can determine which community’s practices better produce
mutual interpretability, Velleman would grant that they could. Anyone who is a member
of a community can give reason to their community to change a practice if it does not
facilitate mutual interpretability. And by being a member of any community, a person
possesses knowledge of the level of mutual interpretability in that community. Yet,
importantly, when saying which community’s mores better facilitate mutual
interpretability, they would not be comparing the two communities morally. They would
simply be determining which community has a higher mutual interpretability, and then,
within each community, analyzing which mores are beneficial or harmful. A certain
practice might help mutual interpretability in one community, but hurt it in another
community. This is because the more or practice might be conceptually completely
different in the two communities.
At this point, we may want to deny that conceptual frameworks matter at all in
our ability to give reason for change. When told that we cannot give the Kikuyu tribe a
reason to get rid of female circumcision because we don’t understand their conceptual
framework, we might respond: “That doesn’t matter. One just has to understand what it
is like to be a human being. Human beings flourish better with total freedom, something
that is clearly lacking in the Kikuyu community.” This seems reasonable. After all, we
all have a shared nature as human beings. Isn’t being human simply enough to truly
understand another community? Again, Velleman would say that it is not. He would
reply that our reasoning about “total freedom” is primarily a result of the society we are

17

raised in. Our mores center on individuality and the freedom of each person. That is the
framework through which we understand ourselves and others. Not every community
has the same focus as ours on individuality. The term “total freedom” we are using is a
term specific to our own conceptual framework, tailored to our understanding. In a
community less focused on the individual (and more on the community), freedom would
not be viewed in the same way. Freedom might be viewed as being free of want, or lust,
or something else. It might not be freedom to do things. It might instead be freedom to
feel things. A different example that would help Velleman’s point: many Asian
communities focus much more on the community than on the individual. Are we really
in a position to say that our western conceptual framework does a better job at accounting
for mutual interpretability than the other community, without being a part of that
community?
However, there are still some things that seem so obviously wrong that anyone
could give a reason to change them. This list includes but is not limited to slavery, mass
murder, subjugation, and torture. I will pursue this intuition in forming my critique of
David Velleman’s argument. My argument will not claim that perspective is not
important. In fact, I will reaffirm its importance. However, I differ from Velleman in
that I believe there are ways to gain a valid perspective of a community other than
actually living in it. In the next section of my paper, I will discuss how and to what
degree one can gain an inside perspective of another community. Then I will discuss
whether this justifies one in giving reason to another community to change one of these
horrible practices. By the end of my paper, I will have shown that David Velleman
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should agree that there at least some cases in which anyone can gain a sufficient
perspective of another community to give that community a reason to change a practice.
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IV.

An Outsider’s Perspective
It might be helpful to start by examining our intuitions about reason-giving.

There are many practices in the world, both in one’s own community and other
communities, that do not seem directed towards increasing people’s ability to live with
and understand each other. Some of these practices may seem not so important, but
others seem too important to ignore. I may not have lived in the southern United States
during the early 19th century, but it still seems like I understand something about slavery
and its effects on people. The institution of slavery in the United States seems to have
caused great pain to a large number of people. Can I not justifiably say that an institution
such as slavery damages mutual interpretability, and thus give reason for its elimination?
I have not lived in the particular community that I am criticizing, but why is that the only
qualification that allows me to understand the level of mutual interpretability in the
community? This intuition that we may have understanding from outside of the
community is very strong. It gnaws at us when we hear or read about systems of
oppression and discrimination in other communities (as well as our own). We believe
that we have reasons for these systems to disappear. For a moral objectivist, this is not a
problem. They believe in universal moral truths, and the inability to understand the
conceptual framework of another community is not an issue. For the relativist, it is more
of a problem. We don’t like to think that all of our criticisms are just ignorant gibberish
from an outsider. How does a relativist explain the feeling that they can give another
community a reason to change, while admitting that everything is relative?
In order to explain this feeling, the relativist must appeal to the idea that we can
gain an adequate understanding of another community’s conceptual framework without
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living in that community. This is the argument that I will now make. I will attempt to
show that as outsiders, there are certain cases where enough relevant knowledge can be
gained to criticize a practice or institution of another community. Of course, not all
practices are fair game in this argument. Many practices involve a deeply nuanced
understanding of the social dynamics of a community. However, these cases are
generally not as pressing as others. They may involve practices of lying, or swindling, or
other minor moral infractions. The cases that seem clearly wrong to us, such as slavery,
will be my main focus.
Imagine a refugee from a community in which slavery is still practiced. He flees
from enslavement in the diamond mines of Africa to Europe and experiences freedom
from the force of threat for the first time (he has been in slavery since a child). This
newfound freedom liberates the man in all sorts of ways. He begins to regain mental and
spiritual stability. He begins to recover from the trauma of being enslaved. Of course, it
is not as if he needed to flee the slave-society in order to realize its wrongness. It is
obvious to anyone in such an awful situation that what they are experiencing is awful for
mutual interpretability. Velleman agrees with this. Anyone can give reason from within
their own community for it to change its moral practices. As someone with the inside
perspective, the slave understood the reasons for acting and the effects of actions on the
psyches of the people. This is uncontroversial. He may no longer live in the community
in question, but he is still obviously justified in giving a reason to this community to
change. I believe there is a hidden controversy in this that will be damaging for
Velleman. Let’s examine why we believe the refugee can give reason to his former
community to change, even though he no longer lives there. The clear answer is that his
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experiences living in the community justify this ability. Certainly this is true. His
experiences gave rise to knowledge. Through this knowledge, he recalls the lack of
interpretability in the community, and gives a reason for his former community to
change. In essence, it is knowledge that gives justification for reason giving.
Now, another hypothetical scenario: the refugee makes friends with a European
who has never lived in a slave-holding community. Over time, the refugee tells the
European all about his time in the community. He relays every detail of the experience,
communicating just exactly how subjugation makes the slaves feel. Over time, the
European develops a quite vivid understanding of the experience. He comes to
understand to some degree the complex emotions involved in being a slave. He learns
how people think and act in such a community. Is this knowledge gained by the European
relevantly different from the knowledge of the former slave in its ability to provide
reason for change? Obviously, it is different. The refugee lived the experience, and the
European did not. I agree that this distinction seems important. However, when we look
further, it appears there is no legitimate reason for maintaining it. What might this reason
be? Velleman might say that the experience itself is what provides the reason-bearing
force. Yet it is not the experience itself that provides the reason-bearing force. It is the
knowledge gained from the experience. If, then, the knowledge can be accurately and
vividly conveyed, there is no need for the direct experience. The European will possess
the relevant knowledge to determine that mutual interpretability is not well accounted for
in the community. He is not conjuring up some dream of what it is like to be a slave.
Through the refugee’s experience, he understands a real, lived perspective- the original
perspective P. This perspective, under Velleman’s view, is what gives someone the
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ability to provide reasons to their community to change. If the European is able to
inhabit the perspective to an adequate degree, he should be able to provide a reason for a
community to change just as the former slave can.
Yet Velleman may still want to maintain that there is some importance in being
the refugee. The slave, he might argue, has an irreplaceable primary experience of how it
feels to be subjugated and discriminated against in that community. This, and only this,
gives someone the ability to give their community a reason to change. Yet, he does not
seem to believe this. If this is the case, then why does he allow other people in the
community, including the very people doing the enslaving, to give reason for the
community to change? When the slave master gives the community a reason to change,
it is presumably a reason based on how the community’s mores make the slaves feel.
This requires the slave master to access the slave’s experience, which, importantly, is not
his or her own lived experience. So, lived experience cannot be the criterion for reasongiving. Granted, this slave master understands the mores of the community from an
inside perspective, a difference from the European. So it is true that he has felt the
“weight” of the community’s mores in a way that the European has not. But again, is this
what justifies him in giving reason for the practice to change? It does not seem like it is.
This slave master would simply feel more pressure to perpetrate the practices of the
community. Does he need to somehow “overcome” this pressure and triumphantly give
reason for his community to change? This seems like an arbitrary criterion. After all, it
seems like the pressure would only make it less likely for real, lasting improvements in
mutual interpretability to develop.
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There is another way that Velleman might attempt to counter my argument. Early
on, I described his claim that conceptual frameworks are so different from community to
community that no community can understand another. Velleman could argue something
along these lines: that as much as the refugee tries to convey what life was like in his
former community, something about the mores of the community will remain
inaccessible to the European. When the refugee tries to explain his experiences, he will
use terms or concepts that are understood totally differently in each community. The
European will bring along his own preconceptions of how sociality should be in a
community. When he listens to the refugee’s story, he will listen to the experiences
through his own framework. I am not sure there is sufficient justification to believe that
there can be absolutely no adequate understanding of a more in another community. I
will accept that there can be some misunderstanding between communities about
concepts that are more nuanced, such as lying or cheating. But can there really be any
confusion about concepts as important to mutual interpretability as slavery? Perhaps
there can be some confusion about what exactly slavery entails in a given society. Yet I
refuse to concede that there could be such a great rift between communities that one
could not accurately perceive a complete lack of liberty and its detrimental effects on
mutual interpretability. When the refugee tells the European, “I do not believe that those
who enslaved me thought of me as another human being,” there is little room to
misinterpret. This matter of conceptual frameworks is obviously a matter of degree. I
will not argue that an outsider can access and evaluate all of the mores of another
community. Only for mores that obviously damage mutual interpretability is one
justified in giving a reason for change. Of course, this may seem to fall into dangerous
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territory. Many things seem obviously wrong to outsiders who are actually just
conceptually confused. How do we prevent this confusion and limit our reason-giving to
cases that we actually can gain a real understanding of? In the next section, I will give
several criteria that must be met for one to be justified in giving a reason for change.
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V.

Criteria for Reason Giving
These criteria are not based on one’s own moral opinions of another community.

They are based on whether that community fails to adequately account for mutual
interpretability. In certain cases, this knowledge is accessible to an outsider with a
different conceptual framework. My first criterion addresses a community’s failure to
include a certain group of people in the development of a shared way of life. In cases
where a group is deliberately constructed as uninterpretable, or excluded from
interpretability, we can give this community a reason to change.
Oftentimes, this takes the form of subjugation that is reinforced through social
custom or institution. Naturally, people in this position come to be very confused
existentially. They are distressed and distraught, unable to understand themselves or
others around them. The slave finds himself constantly bewildered at the community’s
inability to understand him as a human being, instead of just a tool to be used for wealth
accumulation. It might be asked what exactly I mean when I say that the slave is not able
to understand himself or the mores of the community. One could argue that the slave has
a pretty clear understanding of both of these things, even if he is subjugated. He
understands that he is a victim of a system in which he is used for profit. He may feel
badly, but that does not mean he does not understand why he feels badly or why the
community has structured its mores in the way that it has. In responding to this criticism
it might help to return to Velleman’s original question of how to assess the level of
mutual interpretability in a community. He writes, “How well, in other words, have the
members of a community managed to develop a shared way of life?” (67). Clearly, in
such a case, not very well. Their way of life involves one side of the community
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controlling the other side of the community. The more powerful half utilizes their power
to deny the less powerful half any input in designing the community’s mores. It is not a
“shared” way of life. It is a way of life designed by some for the benefit of some.
Note that this is not a moral criticism of a community. It is a practical criticism of
a community. If we know that a community has very low mutual interpretability because
one faction of this community has imposed their mores on another, then we are not
placing our own conceptual framework on the situation or dipping into moral territory.
We remain safely outside of moral territory, an important point if we want Velleman to
grant the validity of our reason-giving. Such a community did not converge on mores.
Mores were imposed on one group forced to remain in the community. This ability to
give reason is of course contingent on our having accurate knowledge of the community,
which I will address shortly.
In his earlier book, Practical Reflection, Velleman reinforced the importance of
mutual cooperation in sociality. He writes: “If you want to be understood, then one of the
things you must understand is that [the other party is] trying to be understood. And if
[the other party] desires to be understood by you, then his so desiring is one of the things
that he must make you understand” (33). This appears complicated at first. It can be
simplified as follows: in any interaction, the actors must show the other that they are both
trying to understand and trying to be understood. Cooperation is a prerequisite for
sociality and the quest for mutual interpretability. A community must converge on
mores, a cooperative process that takes into account the desires of all parties involved.
When a community develops in the manner of the slave-holding society that I just
described, it is not a cooperative effort. There is no attempt to understand the slave class
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or converge on mores that might take into account their desires. It is this lack of a basic
level of mutual interpretability that gives an outsider the ability to give a reason for
change. Not even the bare requisites of sociality appear in this community. We can use
another example to illustrate this point: apartheid-era South Africa.
In this community, the colonial class used their power to construct the mores of
the community. These mores perpetrated an ignorance of the desires of the black South
Africans on a systematic and personal basis. The systematic basis included laws and
strict social codes. The personal ignorance involved face-to-face interactions in which
individual whites reinforced the subjugated status of the black South Africans. They
made rude comments, or physically assaulted them, or scorned their request for a raise.
The black South Africans must have wondered how these things became acceptable (how
they became “doables”). Surely, if they were to reciprocate the treatment they received,
it would not be acceptable. Then why, they must have thought, is it acceptable for them
to do the same thing to us? This example illustrates exactly how ignoring the desires of a
portion of the community leads to difficulty in understanding the mores of the
community. Surely, the black South Africans could come to understand the mores in a
literal way. They would know not to make rude comments to white South Africans, and
especially never to physically assault them. What they would not be able to understand is
how it became acceptable for it to happen the other way around, and on a systematic
basis.
Why have I specified this first criterion to react to a group’s exclusion from
mutual interpretability, and not just a single person’s? There are several reasons. One,
this systematic exclusion is more dangerous than any personal exclusion could be. When
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something like this is built into the legal code and power structure, it gives citizens an
excuse to be complicit in carrying out the exclusion. A citizen faces the threat of
punishment for opposing the system in thought or action. However, it also makes it
easier to notice and criticize from an outside perspective. It would be difficult for a
community to defend to another community the exclusion of a group of people from the
“game” of mutual interpretability. We can simply examine the legal code (or explicit
social codes) of a community and get a good idea of whether mutual interpretability is
respected. If we see that one group is excluded from what are seen as the basic rights of
the other citizens, this is a clear sign that there is no true attempt to understand this group
as people. No rational person would assent to having a social code systematically deny
his or her desires (they would not converge on mores that involve a denial of their
desires). These instances are sometimes easy to observe from the outside, and sometimes
difficult. Yet these violations are often accessible given the right knowledge of the
community’s practices.
I have argued for my first criterion of when an outsider can give another
community a reason to change: when a group of people is excluded from the “game” of
mutual interpretability. There is another criterion that is equally valid. This criterion
demands that no person be seriously limited by their community’s set of mores in their
attempt to understand themselves. Written another way, it can be said that there must be
a sufficient range of mores available to a person. We do not have to find that people are
discriminated against outright, as in my last example. Someone may follow the mores of
their community perfectly well, yet only do so out of fear. This would be a legitimate
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case for reason-giving from another community. What would such a case look like?
Let’s examine.
Imagine a community where only one sexual orientation is privileged (what a
difficult thing to imagine!). Those who don’t fall under the classification of heterosexual
are socially isolated. They are subject to ridicule and discrimination. Now imagine being
a gay person in one of these communities. There is a choice that you would have to
make. Do you publicly announce your sexuality and open yourself up to ridicule and
discrimination? To make this example stronger, let’s assume that such a position would
force your family to renounce you. It would limit the jobs you are allowed to hold. It
would in all respects make your life harder. Do you make this announcement? Most
likely, you do not. Instead, you obscure your true identity, live a false heterosexual life,
and take this secret to the grave with you. All the while, you live your life wondering if
there is something wrong with you. You regret the fact that your friends and family
cannot know you as you truly are. Your ability to understand yourself, and more
importantly, to have others understand you, is close to non-existent. You feel this way
because your community does not have a sufficient range of mores. Note that this
example is different from the example of apartheid South Africa. In South Africa, the
mores of the community are actively structured around discrimination. It is the existence
of certain mores that give that community a reason to change. In the community we are
currently considering, it is the lack of certain mores that limit the community’s level of
mutual interpretability. A black person could not do anything to avoid discrimination in
apartheid South Africa. In contrast, in our community, a person is forced to make a
choice to avoid discrimination, one that damages their ability to understand themselves.
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Thus, the examples are relevantly different. In the former, the harm to the community
derives from the existence of a malevolent more. In the latter, it is the lack of a
benevolent more.
One could argue that in the case of the latter, it is really also a malevolent more:
discrimination against non-heterosexual people. This may be true, but it does not
describe accurately how people are affected. Once someone is publicly known to deviate
from the standard sexuality of their community, then I agree that the discrimination
functions in the same way as in apartheid South Africa. Yet it is the initial social
pressure to conform to the community’s “normal” sexuality that causes people in my
hypothetical community the most trouble in understanding themselves.
Although this criterion is slightly different from the first, it retains the same
philosophical basis. This is once again an instance of a community failing to converge
well on a shared way of life. We can accurately infer that the “acceptable” ways of life in
this community were developed not through the discourse of all people, but only through
a certain portion of the population. In developing these mores, there was a failure to take
into account the desires of an entire segment of the population, something Velleman
acknowledged as essential in mutual interpretability. And although it should be obvious
at this point, I will emphasize that an implication of Velleman’s particular brand of moral
relativism is that we have a normative responsibility to move towards mutual
interpretability. I will use this as a premise as well. Velleman’s emphasis on progress
means we should always try to advance towards mutual interpretability when possible.
So to say, “It’s all relative anyways, so why try?” is not something Velleman or I believe.
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The principle I formulated, that no person be seriously limited by their
community’s set of mores in their attempt to understand themselves, may be subjected to
criticism. What if someone complains that they feel restricted by their community’s
norm to drive at the speed limit? Or what if they feel restricted by their community’s law
against destroying other peoples’ private property? How do we justify stepping in in
some cases and declaring others to be defenseless? Part of our answer can appeal to the
need for communities to do a good job converging on mores. To remove all traffic laws
would not by any stretch of the imagination account for the desires of the population. It
would increase deaths by automobile accidents, and increase confusion in the community
about why there are no measures to prevent these deaths. Private property is a similar
case. If the basic laws of property in the United States were abolished, total chaos would
ensue. All sorts of other laws would be broken, and any and all convergence on ways of
life would disappear.
There is a more difficult case we must answer, though. Why do we ignore the
person who claims that allowing homosexuality in his community damages his ability to
understand himself and his community? Let’s truly assume that this person faces great
confusion and distress upon his community’s allowance of gay marriage, for example.
Why is this not a valid concern? Can we just ignore this person’s desires and needs in
designing the mores of our community? The critic of my argument would say an
affirmative answer on this question would be a double standard.
To respond to this argument, let’s recall that developing a community requires
converging on a shared way of life. Implicit in this argument is that some people are
going to have to compromise. When examining a community, we should examine who
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has the ability to compromise. In the previous case, only one group has the ability to
compromise. Gay people do not have the ability to magically change their sexual
orientation (although some communities have tried very hard to believe this).
Conversely, the anti-gay group does have the ability to change their opinions. The case
of apartheid South Africa is analogous. A white person in South Africa might have
claimed that seeing blacks achieve equality damaged their ability to understand
themselves and their community. However, the difference is that they had the ability to
change this opinion, even if it was very deeply ingrained. It would have been
unreasonable to expect the black South Africans to magically change their skin color.
I will allow the critic of this portion of my argument one more counter-argument.
Let’s say that there is a community of one thousand white South Africans and one black
South African. To change this community’s mores and allow equality to the black South
African would “burden” one thousand people, and only help one person. Doesn’t this
seem like an argument for maintaining the practices of the community exactly as they
stand? I do not believe so. This would be a utilitarian argument based on the number of
people harmed; therefore it would be a moral argument. My argument is not a moral
argument, it is a practical argument. My argument is that the first priority in a
community’s development of sociality must be those things that one does not have
control over (skin color, sexual orientation, etc.). Any mores specifically designed to
make someone uninterpretable for something they have no choice about must be
eliminated first, before other desires can be taken into account.
There is one relevant failure of my argument. Imagine a community of white
supremacists, living isolated from the rest of the world. There is no possible justification
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under my rationale for giving this community a reason to change. Because everyone in
the community is a white supremacist, and everyone’s desires are accounted for, there is
no lack of mutual interpretability. But is this really that disastrous of a failure for my
argument? Upon examination, it doesn’t really seem to be. This community is not
hurting anyone. They may hold beliefs that we want to criticize, but as long as they do
not actively harm anyone, they are protected from our ability to give them reason to
change. The moment this community actively begins to do harm (make people
uninterpretable through persecution), then we may be able to give them reason to change,
granted that we have accurate knowledge.
I have presented my two principles for when an outsider can give a community a
reason to change. The first is when a class of people is removed from “the game” of
mutual interpretability. The second is when a community does not have a sufficient
range of mores for a group of people. Of course, a person must have the requisite
knowledge in order to present a reason for change to a community. As I wrote earlier,
part of this knowledge entails being able to inhabit the perspective of someone in that
community to an adequate degree. Through the example of the immigrant, I wrote that
one person could come to understand two distinct communities and the basic mores in
each community. The example of the European showed that it is not even necessary to
live in both communities to understand a large amount about each community. We can
come to learn much about a community by simply knowing someone from that
community. Now, I will advance this point even farther. I will argue that one can gain
the relevant knowledge about a community through other sources, such as biographies or
testimonies.
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VI.

Sources of Knowledge
We should revisit my argument about the refugee and the European. Remember

that the European was able to gain reason-giving power by inhabiting the perspective of
the refugee. He was able to inhabit the perspective of the refugee (at least partially)
because the refugee gave him accurate and vivid knowledge of the forces acting on
people in his community. If one accepts knowledge learned this way as adequate, then
why not knowledge from another equally valid source? Why must the knowledge come
from someone known personally? I argue that there are many other channels for gaining
this knowledge.
Let’s use the example of a written account. Instead of communicating his
experience verbally, the refugee wrote a detailed biography about his experience as a
slave. The book contained all of the same knowledge communicated to the European
originally. And instead of becoming friends with the refugee, the European read his
biography. Would there be any difference in the knowledge gained? It does not seem
like there would be. The only possible rebuttal is that there is something gained from
knowing the source of the information personally. This line of reasoning does indeed
have some merit. For we tend to be more impacted by an issue when we know someone
who is affected by it. We are more likely to donate money to a charity working to cure
cancer if someone in our family has had cancer. We have a higher empathetic response,
and the critic argues that this is essential in allowing one to access another’s perspective.
The critic also believes that the empathetic response is stronger when one knows the
person whom they are in conversation with (so to speak). Reading a book, they would
claim, does not transfer the same amount of knowledge as having a face-to-face
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conversation. I admit that there is something valuable to this theory. However, I would
argue that the empathetic response is strong enough to allow someone to develop an
adequately powerful account of what life is like for a person in a different community,
whether they know this person or not. Think of the ease with which you can become
attached to a character, fictional or real, in a book or movie. This person takes on a real
significance to you. You are happy when they succeed, sad when they fail. One’s
empathetic response is very high in these situations, sometimes even higher than it might
be with people one actually knows.
Another response to the critic is that the ability to empathize is only half the
battle. An objective understanding of a community’s mores is equally necessary to give
reason for change. For this, being able to inhabit another’s perspective is important, but
not for reasons of empathy. Its importance lies in understanding why people act the way
they do. It also lies in understanding the weight (or gravity) placed on certain mores.
Understanding the intense gravitational pull in a community towards the sexual
orientation of heterosexual requires factual knowledge. It requires knowing that people
who deviate from the norm are punished through social isolation or other means. It does
not require knowing personally anyone who has faced these punishments. Of course,
emotional understanding is important. Knowledge means nothing if one does not
empathize with those who face social isolation or other similar punishments. One might
reasonably have a more powerful perspective by empathizing more highly. However, I
maintain that because one can empathize strongly with fictional characters or people who
are not personal acquaintances, that having personal acquaintances is not as important as
the critic might make it seem.
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There are several problems with gaining knowledge of a community from a
source other than personal experience. The first is accuracy. From reading a biography,
or even listening to someone talk, we cannot know if what someone says about their
community is true. There may be reason to doubt what the person says or writes. The
second problem is one of scale. We may read the biography of one person, and this
person might claim that the problem they face is a common one in their community. We
cannot know if this is true. It might be a problem like the one faced by the man who feels
limited by his community’s restriction on speeding. How do we go about dealing with
these potential problems?
I admit that we may not be able to completely solve either of these problems. But
the same method may help us be surer that we are gaining accurate knowledge of the
community in question. This method is to corroborate sources. The more sources one
has that speak of the same problem, the more likely it is to be accurate. Also, by sheer
number, one can tell that the problem is one faced by many in the community.
Biographies aren’t the only way to access another’s perspective. Documentaries, news
articles, and other like sources in sufficient number are equally helpful. Of course, if the
source does not offer insight into how a certain practice makes someone feel, it is useless.
We can’t read a newspaper article about female circumcision and assume knowledge of
how it makes people feel. Only when we hear the perspectives of many people affected
by the practice can we form an adequate perception of the perspectives in the community.
And even once we gain this perspective, if it does not fit into one of our two categories of
outside reason-giving, then we cannot claim to have this power. Otherwise, the powers
of reason-giving would become too expansive and in many cases inaccurate. This is
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because, as Velleman pointed out, there are many cultural concepts that remain
inaccessible to outsiders without sufficient time in the community. These concepts tend
to be lower-level issues such as lying or stealing. The concepts of truth-telling or private
property may be sufficiently different in another community that we may not understand
them. What can be more easily grasped are concepts such as slavery or legally coded
discrimination. Any situation that ignores a large group of people in developing the
mores of the community is obviously a candidate for reason-giving. We must cede some
ground by claiming at this point to only have authority in the most obvious cases.
Otherwise, we risk over-extending our argument and losing the ground we have gained.
There is one more important question on the topic of reason-giving: why should
someone accept a reason to change that comes from outside of their community,
especially if this change will not benefit them? It seems like a white South African might
have no self-interested basis for helping to end practices of apartheid. After all, this
system works quite nicely in his or her favor. By virtue of being a white person, he or
she receives better education, opportunities and personal liberty. What could possibly
convince such a person to let go of their privilege? Anyone attempting to answer this
question faces an uphill battle. The answer must appeal to the desire to understand
oneself and the community that one lives in. Imagine being a small white child growing
up in apartheid South Africa. You become great friends with the children of your black
housekeeper. Once you reach the age of five, though, you are told that you must attend a
different school than your friends. You ask your parents why, and they explain that these
children are not fit for the rigorous schooling that you will undertake. This confuses you.
Your friends seem just as smart and capable as you are. Yet they seem to be separated
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from you and judged inferior because of their skin color. As you grow up, you come to
mostly accept and cease questioning the community you live in. Maybe you even come
to hold some of the same prejudices as your fellow community-members. However, you
can’t shake certain instances in which the inequality of your society seems totally unjust.
You frequent a certain market outside of the white part of town to buy your groceries. At
the market, you notice how quickly the women working the shops are able to calculate
change when handed money. You think to yourself, “She could be a very capable
accountant.” You hear a street performer eject barb after hilarious barb. He is very
funny, much funnier than the white comics you seen on television performing on big
stages. And you question why he could never be on those stages where the white comics
perform. Perhaps you have a certain sense of resignation in those moments, knowing that
it is easier for things to stay the same. Yet you can’t shake the feeling that there is a
fundamental confusion governing your society.
I would guess that most people are able to shed this feeling through some sort of
cognitive dissonance, safe with the knowledge that the community’s mores benefit them
more than they hurt them (I know I personally often fall into this mindset). To change
the mores would hurt their lifestyle, limiting their economic opportunity and general
privilege. So what do we say to this person who sees the mores for what they are but
chooses to ignore them? We can point out to this person that it would be a lot easier to
live day-to-day without the gnawing feeling that they are perpetrating certain practices
that systematically ignore the desires of a large portion of the community. You can also
point out that if they were a truly talented and motivated person, they would succeed in
any community without the advantage derived from an unequal community. Thus, it
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would be a win-win to change the inequality present in their community. Obviously it
wouldn’t be a total win-win. They would lose many advantages stemming from their
privilege. Yet the argument could be made that sacrificing these advantages would be
worth correcting the confusion that governs the community.
This doesn’t solve the problem of convincing the people most certain of the
apartheid system. These people believed strongly that black people were inferior and
deserved to be subjugated. They did not feel that any sort of fundamental confusion
governed their community, nor did they ever feel any distress about their community’s
mores. No amount of argumentation would have convinced them that the system should
be changed. In cases like these, there may be nothing we can do. People will not always
accept reasons for change. Yet it is important to note that these people are not resisting a
reason for change simply because it comes from outside of their community. If someone
within their community were to present an argument for change based on lived
experiences, their reaction would be no different. Thus, there is really no difference in
the effect of reasons that come from outside of the community, as long as these reasons
are based in accurate knowledge. Nor does the response of the person presented with the
reason affect the validity of the reason. People may act irrationally in the face of reason
(a tendency we all fall victim to sometimes). What matters is that the reason comes from
a valid perspective and promotes mutual interpretability.
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VII.

Conclusion

Where does this leave us on the question of progress in a morally relative world?
David Velleman originally argued that progress can occur, but that it must come from
within each community. I agree that progress is possible in a world of moral relativism,
as each community gets better at facilitating mutual interpretability. However, I differ
from Velleman in that I believe communities can help each other make progress by
providing an outside perspective with a valid reason-giving force. Therefore, progress
moves from a small-scale issue to a large-scale issue. This does not mean that we have
lost moral relativism. Certain issues become “universal” only because people from
different communities are able to place themselves in the community in question. It is as
if we can all travel to different communities, each with their own relative gravity
(provided we have the requisite knowledge to inhabit the perspective). When we
condemn a practice in a certain community, we are not condemning it morally. We are
condemning it because it damages mutual interpretability in that particular community.
We may be able to condemn female circumcision in a community where it is forced on
those who don’t desire it, rather than arrived at organically. We are not condemning
female circumcision itself as morally wrong. If a woman freely chose to become
circumcised at an age where she could rationally make choices for herself, we would not
morally condemn her. The reason for our lack of condemnation here is that there is no
loss of interpretability. It is the same reason that we do not charge a boxer with assault
after he knocks out his opponent. Our judgments of actions are dependent on the context.
And in this case, the context is whether the action damages a person’s ability to
understand themselves and the mores of the community.
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True, some actions such as enslavement are likely to be considered wrong no
matter what community they take place in. But this again does not mean we are moving
towards a universal moral condemnation of slavery. Rather, we are looking at slavery in
each community where it exists, examining its effect on the community, and likely
deciding that in fact it does damage mutual interpretability. There is no universally
wrong practice in the meta-ethical sense (to borrow Velleman’s words again). We cannot
outright say that killing is “wrong” in the moral sense, nor for slavery or stealing. Each
claim requires us to inhabit the perspective of someone in the community, understand the
mores as best we can, and judge whether mutual interpretability is harmed in one of the
two ways I have posited in this essay. The reason for change one gives is never a moral
reason. It is a practical reason. In practice, a certain set of the community’s mores (or
lack of certain mores) serves only to damage mutual interpretability. Whether this
practice is something we personally deem morally wrong or right is irrelevant. If it
damages mutual interpretability in that community, it must be changed for practical
reasons.
My argument that in certain cases one community can give reason to another
community to change should be encouraging. David Velleman’s account argued that
there are no such cases. No criticism could ever carry reason with it, he said. Upon
encountering as an outsider a civilization such as Nazi Germany or the slave-holding
United States, we would have to renounce any legitimate claim to tell them to change
their practices. Of course, I do not believe David Velleman to be any sort of sympathizer
of amoralists. He strongly encourages people to criticize the communities in which they
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see some sort of wrong occurring. He simply wanted to emphasize that our criticism
carries no reason with it as an outsider. I do not agree with this in all cases.
I attempted to argue that there is a way “in” as an outsider. This way “in”
involves learning a sufficient amount about a community’s mores and how they make the
people in the community feel (how the community’s mutual interpretability is affected).
This knowledge, if adequate, can allow us to access the perspective P of a member of the
community, thus allowing us knowledge of how the community’s mores affect people.
With the ability to inhabit the perspective P, we gain the ability to give reason for the
community to change. As I pointed out, this reason-giving power is limited to the mores
that are understandable to an outsider with sufficient knowledge. To make my argument
even stronger, I limited this power more, allowing reason-giving power only in two cases.
The first case is when one group of people is deliberately made uninterpretable, to
themselves and to others. The second case is when a community lacks a sufficient range
of mores to make a person or group of persons interpretable to themselves or others.
Both of these cases qualify because they do not meet the requisites of sociality. They fail
to account for the desires of a portion of the community in developing a “shared” way of
life. Whether or not the community has purposely structured their mores this way, we as
outsiders can provide reasons for these mores to change.
Everything I have argued is consistent with David Velleman’s own arguments.
He must allow people to understand different communities, or else his conceptual
framework would not be able to accommodate our modern world in which people are
increasingly multinational (or for the sake of our terminology, multi-communal). He also
must allow people to access different perspectives even without living in the community.
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Otherwise, he denies our ability to empathize with a person who feels unable to
understand themselves or the people around them. Moreover, he denies our ability to
interpret which mores are causing this sort of damage. This seems silly, as often we are
told directly by our sources which specific mores damage their ability to understand
themselves. For major violations of mutual interpretability, one only needs to understand
the basic mores of the community to adequately understand why those mores should be
changed.
Thus, we have shown that there is at least one version of moral relativism in
which one community can give another community a reason to change a practice. This
ability is premised on the claim that all communities should try to facilitate and respect
mutual interpretability as much as possible. When it is obvious that there is no effort to
converge on a shared way of life, or when one side is excluded from the development of
mores, we can give a reason for this community to change.
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